The draft text of the safeguards agreement between India's Department of Atomic Energy and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) secretariat appears to be splitting the differences. That's good news. Sometime splitting the differences is prudent compromise, and at other times it kills the baby.
One of the key phrases in the agreement is “corrective measures”. Put simply, the agreement stipulates New Delhi’s right to act in the event of a breakdown of the agreement for international cooperation.
There are two sets of issues/concerns being raised about this phrase. First concern is about the palce ment of this phrase -- the reference to “corrective measures” appears only in the preambular section of the agreement, not in the body of the text. This should not be a major issue.
The second concern is about the meaning of “corrective measures”, which would become operational if the permanent safeguards and assured supplies breaks down. On permanent safeguards India offers the assurance “against withdrawal of safeguarded material from civilian use at any time”. At the same time, India wants to make sure that, after accepting safeguards, it should not be left high and dry on fuel supplies. Hence the compromise language in the IAEA draft affirms about “creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”.
This -- the focus on diversifying suppliers and the creation of a strategic reserve -- appears to ensure a lifetime supply covers many of the contingencies.
However, the stipulation is so vague and compromised that it has left all the constituents dissatisfied and anxious.
No one understands or knows for certain what this provision means, and/or when it would become operational. Being vague about the details of the provision has suited both the Government of India and IAEA but not the well-meaning interpreters of the agreement within and without the country.
The Indian citizens are worried that India may be caught in a nuclear bind (of interrupted supplied), and the Non-proliferation critics in the U.S. and other parts of the globe are worried that India may exploit the provision for furtherance of its nuclear goals. So there you have it -- splitting the differences may prove to be suboptimal.
The draft text as provided by The Times of India can be accessed at the following link --
No comments:
Post a Comment