Monday, November 12, 2007

The US response to Pakistan crisis will impact its Iraq and Iran policies

Over the last six years, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has lost the support of not only the Islamic fundamentalists but also some of the secular nationalist elements in Pakistan.

And now, with the imposition of emergency and suspension of the constitution, President Musharraf has also cast away any support and sympathy from liberals, internationalists, and remaining secularists.

With one stroke by imposing emergency rule, President Musharraf has trapped himself, Pakistan, and the U.S. in sand box. Musharraf is ad hoc and uncertain in his beliefs and actions – showing all signs of a confused man. Musharraf does not have a face-saving exit strategy. That’s the tragedy.

Musharraf has not only knotted himself but placed the U.S. in a very awkward situation. With terrorists still operating with impudence in Pakistan, and Afghanistan being still very fragile, the U.S. can not walk away from Pakistan.

But Musharraf has left the U.S. with no other choice but to reject Musharraf’s actions and impel him to democratization of the polity immediately – the U.S. should at least insist on shared governance of his military and political power.

If the U.S. rationalizes Musharraf’s actions and dithers, how can the U.S. justify its intervention in Iraq (and potentially in Iran.) With no weapons of mass destruction and other less than attractive reasons, the compelling strategic, political, economic and intellectual argument for intervention in Iraq is the creation of democratic societies in the Middle-East. And it can be persuasively argued that Saddam Hussein was a monumental impediment in this goal.

Current Musharraf’s actions seriously challenge and undermine the legitimacy of this argument. After all, Pakistan is a country with well established democratic institutions – a constitution, well-formed legal institutions, a tradition of elections, accepted political parties and leaders, legal institutions – and a history of appreciating democratic values.

If the U.S. supports and/or rationalizes open and blatant attempts to stifle the concept of shared governance in Pakistan which has so many assets for democratic polity, how can any one believe that democratization is even remotely plausible in Iraq?

In a more tactical view, violence, uncertainty and stress caused by the extra-constitutional actions of Musharraf will have a direct impact on the elimination of terrorism and terrorists. There are two immediate consequences. First, Pakistan’s police, military and intelligence resources will be diverted to maintaining the emergency rule. Second, the extra-constitutional actions have created such resentment and anger among the populace that the society is now more than ever fertile for subversive activities by terrorists.

Musharraf’s strategy of creating the impression that he alone is capable of holding Pakistan together, and combat terrorism has lost its currency now. Musharraf's rule will come to end, inevitably so, sooner or later. But Musharraf’s actions should not cloud Pakistan's future.

Musharraf has already shown that he is most susceptible to pressures from the U.S. – with more than $10 billion of aid, it would be most surprising if this were not the case. Under pressure from the U.S and others Musharraf has now assured the country will hold the parliamentary elections will be held in February, and revoked Benazir Bhutto’s house arrest (and may be place her again under house arrest!) though he is not able to make up his mind about the duration of the emergency rule.

So it is time for the U.S to insist that Musharraf immediately revoke the emergency rule, conduct the parliamentary elections in January or February, let the judges return to work and the Supreme Court decide the legitimacy of his election as the President, and shed his military role.

As the U.S. tries to mobilize public and world opinion against Iran, how can Pakistan’s actions be rationalized?

It is time of the U.S. to act in its own interests. Otherwise, its Middle-East policy in particular, and its foreign policy in general, will be a complete muddle for a long time to come.

(Posted on November 12th, 2007)

Friday, November 9, 2007

President Musharraf has trapped himself, Pakistan and the U.S. in a sandbox

Over the last six years because of his commitment to the US to help the US to combat terrorism and fundamentalism after the 9/11 tragedy, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has lost the support of not only the fundamentalists but also the nationalist elements in Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalists and isolationists have targeted the government and him regularly. The escalating violence and chaos has weakened Pakistan immeasurably.

And now, with the imposition of emergency and suspension of the Constitution, President Musharraf has also cast away any support and sympathy from liberals, internationalists, and secularists.

With one stroke by imposing emergency rule, President Musharraf has trapped himself and Pakistan in sand box. Musharraf is ad hoc and uncertain in his beliefs and actions – showing all signs of a confused man. Under pressure from the U.S and others, Musharraf assures the country that the parliamentary elections will be held in February – this time table is not one bit credible given that the constitution has been suspended, the Supreme Court has been dismantled, the opposition leaders have been arrested or have not been allowed to participate in Pakistan’s polity. And then immediately places Benazir Bhutto under house arrest. Yet, again, under U.S. pressure Musharraf promises that Bhutto's house arrest would be only for days.

Musharraf does not have a face-saving exit strategy. That’s the tragedy. If Musharraf had slowly transitioned to a more shared mode of governance and responsibility, he would have been in better position politically and strategically. In this case, Musharraf could have placed some of the failures of governance on his political partners, and possibly secured better cooperation from the various constituencies. Even before the imposition of emergency rule, Musharraf was facing a deeply skeptical populace but now he faces a hostile populace. Therefore, he requires serious political help.

Musharraf has not only knotted himself but placed the U.S. in an awkward situation. With terrorists still operating with impudence in Pakistan, and Afghanistan being still very fragile, the U.S. can not walk away from Pakistan.

But then how does the U.S. justify its relationship with Pakistan when the most compelling reason for intervention in Iraq (and potentially in Iran) is creation of democratic societies in the Middle-East. Musharraf’s actions seriously challenge and undermine President Bush’s arguments regarding diffusion of democratic values in the Middle-East.

In a more tactical view, violence, uncertainty and stress caused by the extra-constitutional actions of Musharraf will have a direct impact on the elimination of terrorism and terrorists. There are two immediate consequences. First, Pakistan’s police and military resources will be diverted to maintaining the emergency rule. Second, the extra-constitutional actions have created such resentment and anger among the populace that the society is now more than ever fertile for subversive activities by terrorists.

Musharraf's rule will come to end, inevitably so, sooner or later. But Musharraf’s actions should not cloud Pakistan's future.

(Posted on November 9th, 2007)

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Review of the reflections (in 2004) on the precarious situation of President Pervez Musharaff

This article appeared in The Anniston Star on March 7, 2004

Precarious predicament for Musharraf
Author: G.K. Kalyanaram Special to The Star
Publish Date: March 7, 2004

Since his commitment to help the US to combat terrorism and fundamentalism after the 9/11 tragedy, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has come under blistering criticism and ridicule by the fundamentalists.

Musharraf has now been the target of at least three assassination attempts. Two of the bloodiest and near-miss attacks have come in the last three months.

The army, the source of Musharraf’s past strength, is beginning to desert him slowly but palpably. In fact, the recent assassination attempts appear to have been abetted by a section of the army. Musharraf has been forced to give up his position as the Chief of Army by the end of 2004 --- that may come even earlier than the publicly stated timetable

While we have much to thank for recent successes in trying to limit the fear and uncertainty of terrorism in the world and at home, our biggest threat for terrorism comes from the extremists operating in and from Pakistan. Pakistan is fragile and vulnerable.

Pakistan as a society and a nation is moderate and peace-loving but almost twenty-years of support to Madrasas and other infrastructure of the radical Islamists has made Pakistan a hospitable home for the fundamentalists.

The Islamic fundamentalists have Pakistan embattled. President Musharraf has been projected as an American lackey.

Furthermore, Musharraf is also now seen as short-changing Pakistan’s national interests and security as a result of his reconciliation efforts with India.

Musharraf and his Prime Minister, Jamali, have made a series of bold and productive decisions to improve the relations with India but that has only angered the fundamentalists even more.

For the first time, the Kashmir issue appears to be addressed in a more thoughtful manner and a dialog is beginning to emerge. The Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and President Musharaff have given a substantial impetus to this dialog in their recent meeting at the regional summit last month. The first set of official talks have begun and they appear to be productive.

Imagine the feelings of terrorist groups which feel yet again betrayed by Musharraf --- this time in curbing their activities in Kashmir. The extremists have already publicly avowed to continue their jihadi activities against Kashmir.

Musharraf has now conceded that several high-level of Pakistan nuclear scientists had sold nuclear and missile technologies to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has now confessed to selling nuclear technologies to rogue nations like Libya, Iran and North Korea. From the documents provided by Libya and Iran, we now know that Pakistan has been the source of the critical centrifuge nuclear expertise.

Musharraf has now begun to crack down upon the errant scientists responsible for the export of the nuclear expertise. Dr. Khan has resigned and President Musaharraf has pardoned him but most close-observers recognize that such scale illegal trade and export in nuclear technologies could not have happened without the knowledge of the army.

The fundamentalists and the army are livid at what they see as yet another betrayal and sell-out by President Musharraf: this time with regard to the Islamic nuclear bomb. To add insult to the injury, the extremists feel that a genuine national hero, Dr. Khan, has been made the scapegoat to satisfy the global community.

It has been a one-two-three punch for Islamic extremists and radicals, and a significant section of the army: betrayal of the Taliban, reneging on the Kashmir issue, and curbing the development of the Islamic nuclear bomb.

Musharraf has alienated not only the fundamentalists but also common citizens who were sympathetic to his efforts to curb extremism and corruption because of his arbitrary and autocratic governance.

If Musharraf is displaced (a likely scenario) and the Islamic radicalists take over, then the potential for calamity is extraordinary. Fundamentalism and terrorism will have a new state-protected home in Pakistan.

It is in the deep self-interest of the US, India and the world at large to help Pakistan (not necessarily Musharraf --- remember the mistake we made in supporting the Shah of Iran and not the people of Iran) to grow democratic and moderate.

And this requires providing Pakistan not only military assistance but also massive economic assistance and expertise in governance and swift devolution of power. Pakistan requires our immediate and undivided attention.

Reflection on Louisiana Governor-Elect Bobby Jindal's 2003 gubernatorial contest


This article appeared in The Shreveport Times on November 2, 2003

November 2, 2003

Blanco-Jindal: How was the race won and lost?

G.K. Kalyanaram

G.K. Kalyanaram is a professor and a management consultant who can be contacted at kalyan@alum.mit.edu.

Congratulations are in order to the governor-elect Kathleen Blanco and candidate Bobby Jindal, and the people of Louisiana for an issues-based and scandal-free gubernatorial elections last Saturday.

History would have been made with the election of either Kathleen Blanco (the first woman to be elected as the governor) or Bobby Jindal (the first non-white to be elected as the governor in the modern times), and history was made. Louisiana can be and should be proud.

However, it is instructive for us to understand the dynamics and the outcome of the election. The following are the summary facts of the two campaigns.

Bobby Jindal was leading in the polls by about 5-8 points with about a week to go; the polls showed Jindal to be in a statistical tie or with a very small lead as Louisiana headed to the polls.
Both Kathleen Blanco and Bobby Jindal ran credible campaigns. Blanco projected a ‘gentle and competent’ persona, and Jindal projected a ‘problem solver’ persona.

Blanco’s final-week advertisement sharply attacking the record of Jindal as the Health Secretary in mid-1990s was tough, and Jindal chose not to respond that advertisement.

Blanco secured about 52% of the vote, and Jindal 48% of the vote in the election. The overall electoral turnout was about 51% -- just about what was expected. The turnout of the African-American vote was about 46% and the white vote was about 55% -- numbers very similar to those in the earlier run-off elections.

Jindal secured about 9-10% of the African-American vote --- double the percentage of the African-American vote earned by the victorious Republican candidates in the recent elections. The final tally of the African-American vote for Jindal was about the same as the pre-election poll projections.

However, Jindal got slightly less than 50% of the white vote in almost the entire state except in one or two areas such as Baton Rouge. This mediocre performance was a surprise, and very much unlike the other victorious Republican candidates who have secured at least about 55% to 60% of the white vote. The final tally of the white vote for Jindal was clearly about 6% - 8% lower than the pre-elections poll projections.

This is what many poll analysts have found time and again: When two candidates for an elected office are equally matched and there is parity or near-parity on all the factors, the pre-election polls overstate the preference for the non-majority candidate by about 5%-10%. This is called the Bradley effect in electoral politics.

So the pollsters have to adjust for this phenomenon. If we had done that, then Jindal would have been trailing in the polls in the final weeks of the campaign, and not leading.

The Bradley effect was first observed in the California gubernatorial elections in 1981. Tom Bradley, the highly regarded Mayor of Los Angeles and a political centrist, was the Democratic Party candidate. Bradley also happened to be African-American. George Dukemejian, a well regarded administrator, was the Republican party candidate. Dukemejian happened to be White.

Both Bradley and Dukemejian ran well-matched campaigns. The polls on the eve of the election showed Bradley leading Dukemejian by about 4%. However, Bradley lost the elections by about 5%.

We have observed such phenomenon in other situations including where a non-black candidate contests in a black-majority congressional district.

There are several possible explanations for the Bradley effect. The most common argument appears to be that the non-majority candidate has to demonstrate his/her values are consistently and firmly. It is the question of “empathy and understanding.”

In the Blanco-Jindal race, Jindal let doubts about his “empathy and understanding” grow and settle by not responding to the sharp attacks on his health care record. Hence, Jindal will have to wait for another opportunity to serve.