The US response to Pakistan crisis will impact its Iraq and Iran policies

Over the last six years, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has lost the support of not only the Islamic fundamentalists but also some of the secular nationalist elements in Pakistan.

And now, with the imposition of emergency and suspension of the constitution, President Musharraf has also cast away any support and sympathy from liberals, internationalists, and remaining secularists.

With one stroke by imposing emergency rule, President Musharraf has trapped himself, Pakistan, and the U.S. in sand box. Musharraf is ad hoc and uncertain in his beliefs and actions – showing all signs of a confused man. Musharraf does not have a face-saving exit strategy. That’s the tragedy.

Musharraf has not only knotted himself but placed the U.S. in a very awkward situation. With terrorists still operating with impudence in Pakistan, and Afghanistan being still very fragile, the U.S. can not walk away from Pakistan.

But Musharraf has left the U.S. with no other choice but to reject Musharraf’s actions and impel him to democratization of the polity immediately – the U.S. should at least insist on shared governance of his military and political power.

If the U.S. rationalizes Musharraf’s actions and dithers, how can the U.S. justify its intervention in Iraq (and potentially in Iran.) With no weapons of mass destruction and other less than attractive reasons, the compelling strategic, political, economic and intellectual argument for intervention in Iraq is the creation of democratic societies in the Middle-East. And it can be persuasively argued that Saddam Hussein was a monumental impediment in this goal.

Current Musharraf’s actions seriously challenge and undermine the legitimacy of this argument. After all, Pakistan is a country with well established democratic institutions – a constitution, well-formed legal institutions, a tradition of elections, accepted political parties and leaders, legal institutions – and a history of appreciating democratic values.

If the U.S. supports and/or rationalizes open and blatant attempts to stifle the concept of shared governance in Pakistan which has so many assets for democratic polity, how can any one believe that democratization is even remotely plausible in Iraq?

In a more tactical view, violence, uncertainty and stress caused by the extra-constitutional actions of Musharraf will have a direct impact on the elimination of terrorism and terrorists. There are two immediate consequences. First, Pakistan’s police, military and intelligence resources will be diverted to maintaining the emergency rule. Second, the extra-constitutional actions have created such resentment and anger among the populace that the society is now more than ever fertile for subversive activities by terrorists.

Musharraf’s strategy of creating the impression that he alone is capable of holding Pakistan together, and combat terrorism has lost its currency now. Musharraf's rule will come to end, inevitably so, sooner or later. But Musharraf’s actions should not cloud Pakistan's future.

Musharraf has already shown that he is most susceptible to pressures from the U.S. – with more than $10 billion of aid, it would be most surprising if this were not the case. Under pressure from the U.S and others Musharraf has now assured the country will hold the parliamentary elections will be held in February, and revoked Benazir Bhutto’s house arrest (and may be place her again under house arrest!) though he is not able to make up his mind about the duration of the emergency rule.

So it is time for the U.S to insist that Musharraf immediately revoke the emergency rule, conduct the parliamentary elections in January or February, let the judges return to work and the Supreme Court decide the legitimacy of his election as the President, and shed his military role.

As the U.S. tries to mobilize public and world opinion against Iran, how can Pakistan’s actions be rationalized?

It is time of the U.S. to act in its own interests. Otherwise, its Middle-East policy in particular, and its foreign policy in general, will be a complete muddle for a long time to come.

(Posted on November 12th, 2007)