The American Clean Energy Act, Global Warming and the Position of China and India

The American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey) was recently approved (narrowly) by the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill now goes to the U.S. Senate for consideration.

There are several provisions of the bill -- some are bold and others modest, some progressive and others status quoist. With respect to Global Warming and Carbon emission reduction, the Act mandates, "Starting in 2012, ACES establishes annual tonnage limits on emissions of carbon and other global warming pollutants from large U.S. sources like electric utilities and oil refiners. Under these limits, carbon pollution from large sources must be reduced by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. To achieve these limits, ACES establishes a system of tradable permits called “emission allowances” modeled after the successful Clean Air Act program to prevent acid rain. This market-based approach provides economic incentives for industry to reduce carbon emissions at the lowest cost to the economy."

So, per ACES Act, the United States is using 2005 as the benchmark, and hoping to reduce the carbon emissions by about 17 percent in 2020. 

Three important policy elements of the India-US Nuclear and 123 agreements

As India debates and will vote for the India-US Nuclear agreement through its members of parliament (it is a proxy vote in that the members of parliament will be voting whether the parliament trusts the current government or not), and as individual members of parliament are being tugged in different directions including their own conscience, there are three policy questions they should consider.

Based on their assessment on these three policy elements, the members of parliament should cast their votes.

(1) Will the safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the exemption obtained from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group assure India uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel and technology in perpetuity if India abides by the IAEA agreement even if the United States exercises the Hyde Amendment prerogative? (The Hyde Act in the India-US Nuclear agreement prohibits the U.S. administration from directly or indirectly assisting India with lifetime fuel supplies after suspension of the deal).

Simply put, is there separability between the agreement with IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (bilateral 123 agreement), and the India-US Nuclear agreement?

The Indian government including Prime Minister ManMohan Singh and Congress party president Mrs. Sonia Gandhi appears to think that the answer to this question is "Yes". Several others -- policy leaders and scientists including P. K. Iyengar (former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission), A. Gopalakrishnan (former Atomic Energy Regulatory Board chief) and A.N. Prasad (former Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Director) assert that the answer is "No". (The three scientists, "Therefore, the government owes a clarification to the Parliament and the public about how they intend to avoid the consequential huge economic loss from the non-operation of these extremely costly imported reactors, as a result of fuel denial.”)

(2) Will the Nuclear agreement with the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and/or the agreement with the United States weaken, in any manner, India’s nuclear deterrent and an ability to protect & promote indigenous R&D efforts in nuclear technology?

Simply put, will India's national security and/or sovereignty be compromised? The government says, "No". Others assert that the agreements would compromise the security interests at least some.

(3) Will the Nuclear agreement with the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and/or the agreement with the United States have negative collateral effects on other areas of national interest such agriculture, defense and space?

Simply put, will India's national interests be protected? The government says, "Yes". Other including Placid Rodriguez assert that India's national interests may be compromised. (Rodgriguez, "My greatest reservation (about the deal) is that the strategic alliance between India and the US is going into agriculture because in the other three sectors (defence, space and nuclear) we are strong and we can go independently and we will go.)

The proposed agreement between India and International Atomic Energy Agency: Is it a prudent compromise or an unworkable compromise?

The draft text of the safeguards agreement between India's Department of Atomic Energy and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) secretariat appears to be splitting the differences. That's good news. Sometime splitting the differences is prudent compromise, and at other times it kills the baby.

One of the key phrases in the agreement is “corrective measures”. Put simply, the agreement stipulates New Delhi’s right to act in the event of a breakdown of the agreement for international cooperation.

There are two sets of issues/concerns being raised about this phrase. First concern is about the palce ment of this phrase -- the reference to “corrective measures” appears only in the preambular section of the agreement, not in the body of the text. This should not be a major issue.

The second concern is about the meaning of “corrective measures”, which would become operational if the permanent safeguards and assured supplies breaks down. On permanent safeguards India offers the assurance “against withdrawal of safeguarded material from civilian use at any time”. At the same time, India wants to make sure that, after accepting safeguards, it should not be left high and dry on fuel supplies. Hence the compromise language in the IAEA draft affirms about “creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”.

This -- the focus on diversifying suppliers and the creation of a strategic reserve -- appears to ensure a lifetime supply covers many of the contingencies.

However, the stipulation is so vague and compromised that it has left all the constituents dissatisfied and anxious.

No one understands or knows for certain what this provision means, and/or when it would become operational. Being vague about the details of the provision has suited both the Government of India and IAEA but not the well-meaning interpreters of the agreement within and without the country.

The Indian citizens are worried that India may be caught in a nuclear bind (of interrupted supplied), and the Non-proliferation critics in the U.S. and other parts of the globe are worried that India may exploit the provision for furtherance of its nuclear goals. So there you have it -- splitting the differences may prove to be suboptimal.

The draft text as provided by The Times of India can be accessed at the following link --

draft-text_iaeaindia_toi-july-10

Indian policy leaders and citizens have to carefully consider the geopolitics in assessing the India-US Nuclear agreement

As India debates the merits of the India-US Nuclear agreement (123 agreement), public policy leaders and citizens one must consider three the current and potential geopolitics in determining the acceptability of the India-US Nuclear agreement. There are at least three different elements to be considered --

(1) The Larry Pressler Amendment which was in effect in the U.S. with regard to the export/sale of military technology to Pakistan mandated that the President of the United States had to certify to the U.S. Congress that Pakistan was not misusing the military technology. In 1990 the unthinkable happened. Pakistan had paid billion of dollars for the purchase of more than F-16 fighter aircrafts. But the then President George H.W. Bush refused to provide the certification, and Pakistan was denied the F-16 fighter aircrafts though it had paid for them. Pakistan had got those aircrafts in 2005-2006 when President Bush decided to grant India exemption from the sale of nuclear technology and fuel.

(2) We should remember that first nuclear power station -- Tarapur Atomic Power Station -- built in India ran into serious difficulties in the 1960s. The nuclear power station was built with the help of the US and Europe, and with the assurance of continuous nuclear fuel supply. However, because of many domestic and global pressures including the pressure of the Non-proliferation advocates, the United States and France pulled out of the agreement abruptly. India was stranded but thanks to the leadership of the Indian scientists and the political leadership including Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India developed the nuclear and space technology indigenously.

Congratulations to India that in spite of the attempts to impute a variety of motives to India, India never pulled the Tarapur Atomic Power Station out of the IAEA safeguards.

(3) Assuming that the Nuclear agreement is consummated, what will India do if any party -- be it India or the U.S. (because of Hyde Amendment) -- reneges from the agreement in the future? Where will India go for the nuclear fuel and technology? Imagine the scenario twenty-years from now. Assume India has 30 nuclear power plants in different parts of the country and abruptly India loses supply of most of the fuel. That would be disastrous.

The world certainly has changed the 1960s and even from 1990 but it is also likely to change again in 20 years. India should, therefore, consider the geopolitics of the nuclear agreement. dispassionately.

What is the thinking on Iran-India Gas Pipeline?

For quite sometime now (since 1990), India and Pakistan have been discussing -- on and off -- transporting gas (natural gas) from Iran oilfields to India. The pipeline for such transport from Iran to India will be through Pakistan and even some parts of Afghanistan. That and the enormous estimated cost ($7.5 billion) make the proposition very complicated, if not almost impossible. There are challenging political, economic and diplomatic considerations. Here are just a few --

Assuming that the India-Pakistan political and economic relations are honky-dory, Afghanistan is a mine-field. The political uncertainty and instability in Afghanistan for the last 30 years is evident. So how will the safety of the pipeline be assured? What is the guarantee that the pipeline will not become hostage to political and even religious angst and anger?

Of course, the relations between Pakistan and India is far from reliable. Even as late as in years 1999-2000, India and Pakistan were poised to go to war. Of course, there are constant disagreements over small and big issues -- terrorism, cross-border military incursions, perceptions of slight.

Most difficult of all these challenges is the Kashmir valley. The Kashmir valley issue has no solution at all. Pakistan political leaders are unlikely to ever give up the claim that Kashmir valley should be transferred to Pakistan -- in fact, no Pakistan political leader can afford to do this politically. Of course, India will never let anyone impinge or question its sovereignty -- Kashmir is an integral part of India. If Kashmir valley was not such a narrow and small geographic area, and if there were some natural geographic divides, may be there could have been some give-and-take on the land. But that is not the case.

What if the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline becomes a reality, and India starts using the enormous amount of natural gas for consumer and industrial purposes, and five years down the road, some political leader in Pakistan or some terrorist in Afghanistan decides to hold the pipeline hostage? India's economy will suffer devastating consequences.

What if Iran decides to raise the price of the natural gas? By supplying such large volumes of natural gas, and with the economic necessity of using the pipeline, Iran will have a near-monopolistic power. Even as the project is on the drawing board, Iran has already demonstrated its unreliability. So what can be of the future?

The pipeline project reached a setback on July 16, 2006 when Iran demanded a price of $7.20 per million British thermal unit ($6.80/GJ) of gas against India's offer of $4.20 per million British thermal unit ($4.00/GJ). The Indian spokesperson then stated that the price demanded by by Iran was more than 50 percent above the prevailing market price in India. India and Pakistan finally agreed in February 2007 to pay Iran $4.93 per million British thermal units ($4.67/GJ) but some details relating to price adjustment remained open to further negotiation.

Finally, the political instability and volatility in Iran is too obvious.

Given all these risks, it is not at all clear why India is investing so much time and effort in exploring this alluring but illusional opportunity.

Added to all these complications are two other elements. First, the United States is stoutly against this project as the U.S. is against any relations with Iran. That political reality may soften but it is not likely to change completely. Both Pakistan and India want the good will of the United States for different reasons -- for security reasons for Pakistan and for aspirational reasons for India. Second, China now wants to be part of this project adding to another level of complexity.

So why this project? It just does not add up.

Background: The project was mooted in 1990 with expectations that it will benefit both India and Pakistan, who do not have sufficient natural gas to meet their rapidly increasing domestic demand for energy. The IPI pipeline is a proposed 2,775-km-long pipeline to deliver natural gas from Iran to Pakistan and India. According to the project proposal, the pipeline will begin from Asalouyeh and stretch over 1,100 km through Iran. In Pakistan, it will pass through Balochistan and Sindh but officials now say the route may be changed if China agrees to the project. The gas will be supplied from the South Pars field. The initial capacity of the pipeline will be 22 billion cubic meter of natural gas per annum, which is expected to be later raised to 55 billion cubic metre. It is expected to cost $7.5 billion.

The winners and losers in the Indian debate of the India-US Nuclear agreement

The India-US Nuclear agreement (123) debate is furious in India. The coaltion government led by Congress party, and the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are finally determined to have a go at the nuclear agreement. The communist parties with about 60 parliamentary (Lok Sabha) members are about to withdraw their support to the coalition government but the Samajwadi Party led by Mulayam Singh with about 39 parliament members are all set to support the government.

There is ferocious finger-pointing and heated rhetoric in the Indian debate. Without considering the substance or merit of the agreement, I rate as follows the winners and losers of this debate. I rate on a 1-10 scale, 1 being a perfect loser, 10 being a perfect winner and 5 being no-loss and no-gain.

(1) Congress Party: I give a 5. By pushing aggressively for the consummation of the 123 agreement, the Congress party reinforces its standing as a national party which protects and furthers the country's interests above its own party interests. But the near-collapse of the political alignments for (governance) now and for the forthcoming elections, and the great uncertainty about the final approval of the agreement by the U.S. Congress in good time, and the eventuality that even if the agreement is consummated the United States invokes the Hyde Amendment are too many potential negatives that it make it a 5 for the Congress party.

(2) Mrs. Sonia Gandhi: I give a 5 for the same reasons. The political downsides are too many. But I do laud her ability to put the national interest above the partisan interest.

(3) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: I give him an 8. Even if the Congress party and its allies were to form the next government after the parliamentary elections, it is most likely that Manmohan Singh will be nominated/elected to be the Prime Minister again. Manmohan Singh is, most likely, concluding his serendipitous political life -- first as much hailed reformist Finance Minister and now as the Prime Minister. Given these facts, how can there be a more lasting and memorable legacy than the consummation of this extra-ordinary nuclear agreement?

(4) The political allies of the Congress party: I give them a 5. What are their choices -- be with the Congress party or with the other political party -- BJP.

(5) Bharatiya Janata Party: I give an 8. The Congress party and its political allies won the 2004 parliamentary elections simply because their collection of parties was larger than that of the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies. Take, for example, the state of Maharashtra. The coalition Congress party, the National Congress party led by Sharad Pawar and the Communist parties clearly outdid the combine of Bharatiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena. And so went the story in state after state.

But now the opposition to BJP and its political friends is now fragmented -- most states are likely to witness a triangular contest with Congress and its friends as one contestant, the BJP and its friends as the other contestant, and the Communist parties and other small regional groupings as the third contestant. In such a fragmented contest, BJP is likely to benefit very substantially.

Add to this, the opportunity to woo the Muslim voters who are deeply suspicious of the United States -- not unlike the Muslims all over the world after 9/11.

(6) Lal Krishna Advani: I give him a 9. For a man who is 80 years old and who is not seen as a statesman, and who was almost cast away by his own party after his favorable remarks about Jinnah in 2005, there is a remarkable turn-around in fortunes.

The near implausibility of getting the India-US Nuclear agreement approved?

Let us put aside the substance and merit (or lack thereof) of the proposed India-US Nuclear agreement. Let us examine plausibility of getting the India-US Nuclear agreement done now that the Indian government appears to want to get the agreement done -- the United States government has been waiting on the Indian government.

But here is the timetable --

The next step is negotiations and discussions with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and getting the India-specific elements ratified by the Board of IAEA. This could take 2-3 months.

Subsequently, the agreement has to be discussed and approved by a Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) for the exemption from the ban on supplying nuclear technology to countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT.) NSG is a group of countries that would eventually supply the nuclear technology (fuel and hardware) to India. And this process could take additional couple of months.

Even if the IAEA and NSG approvals are processed simultaneously, the agreements cannot be completed till September.

So the U.S. Congress cannot consider the agreement -- 123 agreement, IAEA safeguards,and NSG exemption -- till after the November congressional elections which are certain to increase the majority of the Democratic party in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and may be even elect Barack Obama to the Presidency.

Given that the Democrats are strongly concerned about Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT), the Nuclear agreement may be received with lots of skepticism in the U.S. Congress. Though the Nuclear agreement would be considered by the lame-duck congress (so the additional electoral Democratic strength will not be reflected), the Democratic leadership can easily derail the consideration of the agreement -- it the leadership so chooses -- by the new congress as Democrats (by virtue of their majority status) control the flow of the bills for consideration.

So the plausibility of getting agreement ratified completely appears dim given this late-hour start.

The New York Times (in a recent editorial) criticizes the India-US Nuclear agreement as too generous and a give away of the the store to India. Of course, this is exactly the opposite of the objections raised by the Communists and the Bharatiya Janata Party in India -- their objections are that the Nuclear agreement potentially impinges upon India's sovereignty and restricts India's future options.

The agreement cannot be placed, if at all, before the U.S. Congress for its consideration and approval before the November elections when the Democratic party is likely to add to its majority in both the Houses of Congress, and may even capture the White House. The Democratic party leaders -- Joe Biden, Barack Obama -- have expressed serious reservations about the agreement.

Given all these facts, and the fact that President Bush's (the champion of the agreement) approval ratings are likely to be hovering in the low 30s, the chances of the agreement being approved by the U.S. Congress is diminishing rapidly.

In the meantime, Lal Krishna Advani is asking for a quick (short) parliamentary session of the Indian parliament houses (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) where the nuclear agreement can be debated and voted either up or down. Congress party and its governing allies are averse to this.

If the Congress party, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were willing to sacrifice power for the consummation of the nuclear agreement (and that is quite noble, indeed), how one wishes the party had moved ahead at least 3-4 months back!

The politics of India-US Nuclear agreement

Thus far, the political alignments in India in the so-called 123 agreement (India-US Nuclear agreement) have been clear.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Congress party has always seen the Nuclear agreement as strategically beneficial to India (after all, it was Manmohan Singh who negotiated the agreement with President Bush, and Mrs. Sonia Gandhi is obviously now persuaded that Manmohan Singh's analyses is quite correct.) They do so now with greater urgency and vehemence. The political and governing allies of Congress party such as DMK, NCP, RLD and others have also been persuaded that the Nuclear agreement is good for India.

The communist parties objected to the 123 agreement largely on the basis of Hyde Amendment which includes great uncertainty for ever because the President of the United states has to certify every year about India's compliance with respect to clear segregation of military and civilian nuclear programs in India. Here is the catch. Let us, say, India relying on the certitude of the 123 agreement goes on to build dozens of nuclear plants for industrial and domestic power. Let us, again say, some 30 years from now some President of the United States refuses to certify to the U.S. Congress India's compliance with the 123 agreement. What will happen? Nuclear technology and fuel supply to India will come to a grinding halt. What does India do then? That's the questions and the catch.

In any case, may be the communists have not been hopeful but they are at least analytical.

BJP and its allies have, most predictably, opposed the 123 agreement but not necessarily with much force of analyses.

So that has brought the Indian government in a predicament. Without the communists' support, the government could collapse.

Then came the savior in the form of Samajwadi Party with about 39 members of parliament. However, the Samajwadi Party developed cold feet when its political allies like Telugu Desam put political pressure. Then this grouping -- Samajwadi party and Telugu Desam and other parties -- announced that they will seek the expert counsel of former President Abdul Kalam.

Per newspaper reports, Abdul Kalam has affirmed that the nuclear agreement was beneficial for the country. So far, so good. But Kalam also purportedly advised that, “India can scrap nuclear deal anytime if warranted." Okay but what will that do? If 30 years from now, India feels harassed and wants to scrap the deal, where will the nuclear fuel and technology come from?

It does not matter who might abrogate the deal -- India or the U.S. -- the uncertainty and potential catch caused by the Hyde Amendment. It is that simple.

And finally, this -- the communist parties and the Prime Mininster are accusing each other of less-than-honest dialogue and conversation. The latest salvo comes from the Prime Minister, and here is the Prime Minister's chronology of events as reported in the media.

"Singh had concluded in August last year that the CPI(M)’s Prakash Karat was uninterested in the merits of the nuclear deal, that his opposition was ideological and not rational. When the actual nuclear text, the so-called 123 agreement, was being negotiated, Singh had ordered National Security Adviser MK Narayanan and atomic energy czar Anil Kakodkar to ensure all the nine demands regarding the deal raised by Sitaram Yechury in Parliament in 2007 were addressed. When the 123 agreement was finalized in late July last year, Singh called in leaders of both the BJP and the Left and showed them the text. The BJP leaders made no complaints. One of them even praised the Indian negotiators. The Left leaders only said they would study the text. Singh was watching TV several days later, and saw Karat demand the Congress “press the pause button” on the deal. At this point, the PM concluded that the Left would never be won over, though he did make one appeal to the Bengal communists in an interview to a Kolkata daily."

India-US Nuclear Agreement -- An Update

The India-US Nuclear agreement is the subject of hope and debate, yet again, in India. Apart from the substance of the pact, the politics (and timing) of the negotiations are mystifying.

First, the substance of the pact. The benefits -- immediate access to nuclear technology and nuclear fuel -- are very robust. India's need for energy is monumental and nuclear energy must form a part of the energy portfolio for India.

The United States -- President Bush -- has made an extra-ordinary offer to India. The President is championing exception (for India) to the 1978 congressional mandate that the non-signatories of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act cannot under any circumstances receive any nuclear technology or fuel from the United States. The so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group follow the United States lead on this matter.

So this is truly historic. India owes a debt of gratitude to President Bush and the United States. However, the Hyde Amendment is troublesome.

The Hyde Amendment which requires the President to advise the Congress every year that India was not diverting nuclear technology and material for weaponry. While it is very true that President George Bush has high respect for India’s integrity and trust. However, what the political landscape would be in 10 or 20 years is anyone guess – it is not clear that a nation’s future can be so tenuously linked to certification by an individual. Look at what happened to Pakistan. The then President Bush in 1990 failed to certify Pakistan’s intentions regarding its nuclear ambitions, and the Pressler amendment called for economic and military sanctions which reverberated till recently.

But President Bush cannot do much about Hyde Amendment -- this is the requirement that the U.S. Congress is imposing for the extra-ordinary exception that it is ready to make for India. This requirement is entirely reasonable from the perspective of Congress, however troublesome that it may be to India or subject to the vagaries of time and the whims and fancies of a future President who may be annoyed with India on some other matter and may decide not to certify based on that irritation. There is no basis on which President Bush can push the Congress to do away with the Hyde Amendment -- President Bush is already facing strong opposition from the Congress, particularly from the Democrats.

Having said this, if India is ready to accept the risk with the Hyde Amendment the Indian Government must have moved with greater dispatch. It was India's responsibility to sign India-specific accords with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before the U.S. Congress can approve the nuclear agreement.

But India has dithered on this matter for almost one year. That is because of the Communists parties who have about 60 parliamentary seats and who have been electoral partners with Congress party are strongly opposed the nuclear agreement -- their opposition is well thought-out, and it is mostly based on the Hyde Amendment.

The Congress party has spent one year trying to persuade the Communists parties -- and it has not been successful. Finally, the Congress party is threatening to go ahead with the negotiations with IAEA but why now? This is so late.

By the time, India concludes its negotiations with IAEA it will be atleast a couple of months. So the agreement cannot placed before the U.S. Congress before fall. But the agenda for fall for the Congress is set in place -- and the Congressional leaders have already said that it is too late for debate and approval of the nuclear agreement.

Unfortunately, President Bush can do only so much -- particularly with the U.S. Presidential and congressional elections looming ahead so close. Once the November elections take place (Democratic party is likely to gain substantial number of seats in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, and quite likely even the White House), President Bush's influence will diminish dramatically.

So what is point of Congress party being so decisive so late? It appears that the Congress party did not want to risk alienating the Communist parties but now since the national elections are only 6-9 months away the Congress party appears ready to roll the dice. Politically, that is not in the self-interest of the Congress party. Unless the Congress party can hold the Communist parties in its fold for the next general elections, its probability of winning those elections will diminish dramatically.

So what is the point? It just does not compute. The nuclear agreement is most unlikely to be approved by the U.S. Congress given the serious time constraints and the dynamics of U.S. political environment. The Congress party is also likely to lower its odds of winning the next elections.

Tibet: India's Dilemma

Tibet remains one of those difficult diplomatic and political, and moral challenges for the world. This is even more so true for India because India's interests are more closely and interwined with Tibet and China.

Since China's defeat of independent Tibetan army in 1949 and the signing of an agreement by the then Tibetan government, the situation has been rife for disagreement and conflict: The government of China recognizes Tibet as autonomous provincial entity of the mainland China but the government of Tibet in Exile seeks independence for Tibet. And there are other disputes which include what constitutes Tibet i.e., the geography of Tibet.

India has always been involved in this dispute. Dalai Lama who is the symbolic head of the Tibet government in exile was welcomed to India in 195o's and since then the Dalai Lama has made Dharma Shala (in India) his home. Of course, the government of China has been very displeased with this arrangement. Furthermore, in China's view Tibet also includes Arunachala Pradesh -- a province in India.

Thus there are many issues of potential dispute between India and China with regard to Tibet. However, over time China and India have let the status quo prevail for the sake of peace. Both countries have been focused on economic growth and development.

However, the forthcoming Olympic games in summer, and Tibet's recent energetic and loud demands and protests all over the world for independence and Dalai Lama's nuanced stance (of both supporting the Olympic games and the aspirations of the Tibetans for independence) in the context of long-standing support of India for Dalai Lama has made it a knotty situation.

Here is the crux of the issue: should India be focused on its immediate national interests based on assessment of geo-political, economic, territorial and security issues? or should India be an agent for fostering religious and cultural freedom and diversity consistent with its traditions (even if it led to serious consequences to immediate political and economic interests)? The answer to these questions will determine India's response to the current Tibetan turmoil including the relay of Olympic torch in New Delhi later in April.